Abstract: We use a natural experiment to investigate the impact of participation constraints on individuals' decisions to invest in the stock market. Unexpected inheritance due to sudden deaths results in exogenous variation in financial wealth and allows us to examine whether fixed entry and ongoing participation costs cause non-participation. We have two key findings. First, windfall wealth has a positive effect on participation. Second, the majority of households do not react to sizeable windfalls by entering the stock market, but hold on to substantial safe assets -even over longer horizons. Overall, these findings suggest that participation by many individuals is not constrained by financial participation costs. Few households participate-directly, or through mutual funds-in the stock market. In the absence of participation constraints this is puzzling, as standard models of lifetime consumption and portfolio choice predict that all households, no matter how risk averse, should invest in stocks [Samuelson, 1969; Merton, 1969 Merton, , 1971 and Arrow, 1974] .
Few households participate-directly, or through mutual funds-in the stock market. In the absence of participation constraints this is puzzling, as standard models of lifetime consumption and portfolio choice predict that all households, no matter how risk averse, should invest in stocks [Samuelson, 1969; Merton, 1969 Merton, , 1971 and Arrow, 1974] .
In this study, we use a natural experiment to test whether non-participation is caused by participation costs. Exogenous variations in wealth result from unanticipated inheritance due to sudden death, and allow us to identify whether individuals face participation constraints in the stock market. Our results reveal that non-participation for the majority of households cannot be explained by financial constraints.
Non-participation in the stock market has generally been explained by moderate fixed entry or ongoing participation costs, which capture anything from transaction costs to time spent on information gathering and preparation of tax returns.
1 Such pecuniary costs can explain non-participation simply because many households have insufficient wealth to make participation worthwhile. For instance, Vissing-Jørgensen [2002] demonstrates that a moderate per-period cost of 50 USD (260 USD) in year 2000 prices is sufficient to explain why half (three-quarters) of non-stockholders in the United States do not participate. 2 Alternatively, fixed costs may be an economist's pecuniary representation of behavioral and psychological factors that make equity ownership uncomfortable for some households. Although economic, behavioral, and psychological explanations are likely to coincide, prior literature has not been able to identify their relative importance for nonparticipation. Consequently, the inability to pinpoint source(s) of non-participation makes it difficult to promote wider stock ownership. In essence, the fixed-cost explanation 1 Prior literature provides a myriad of examples of fixed (pecuniary) costs, but no stringent definition. Examples include trading costs, one-time learning costs, and time and money spent on everything from keeping up with market developments and choosing and monitoring portfolio investments, to filing out tax forms. Fixed entry costs are one-time outlays related to entering the stock market, whereas participation costs are expenses related to staying in the market.
2 Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) estimates the fixed per-period cost by calculating the benefit of stock market participation given observed individual financial wealth and an after-tax equity premium of 5.6 percent.
requires more involved economic policies aimed at lowering the costs to facilitate participation, whereas financial education might limit the effect of behavioral and psychological barriers.
We take a first step toward understanding the relative importance of these two distinct explanations. By exploiting a natural experiment, we formally test whether fixed entry and ongoing participation costs cause non-participation. We use windfall wealth from unexpected inheritance due to sudden death as a plausible source of exogenous variation to identify how these frictions explain non-participation. If fixed entry and participation costs restrict participation, we should expect individuals to respond to windfall wealth by entering the stock market. If, however, behavioral, cognitive and psychological explanations are at play, even sizeable windfalls will have no impact on participation.
Our empirical identification strategy relies on a conservative medical definition of sudden death and unique cause-of-death data from official death certificates to identify 10,344 cases from 346,788 deaths in Denmark over a period of 6 years. Each case is classified as medically unexpected and sudden as well as having resulted in the termination of the household, potentially increasing the beneficiary's wealth. While constituting tragic events, these sudden deaths help us to identify 17,191 beneficiaries who have received a windfall. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that seeks to examine barriers to stock market participation using exogenous variation from one of nature's own experiments.
The advantage of our identification strategy is fourfold. First, as windfall wealth from unexpected inheritance is unrelated to current economic and stock market conditions, it is reasonable to attribute a positive effect of inherited wealth on stock market participation as evidence of the existence of fixed participation costs. Second, by exploiting the variation in the characteristics of beneficiaries, we can enhance our understanding of fixed entry and ongoing participation costs. In particular, we are interested in examining whether the effect of windfall wealth is larger for individuals who the prior literature has identified as having low entry and participation costs. Third, detailed information on the composition of inherited wealth allows us to identify the effect of procrastination by decomposing inherited wealth into inherited stocks and inherited cash. Inheriting an estate that holds stocks alters the active decision from one of choosing to enter the stock market to one of choosing to exit. If procrastination drives non-participation, we should expect to find an additional effect on participation of inheriting a dollar's worth of stock as compared to inheriting the same value in cash. Fourth, our strategy allows us to control for unobserved individual characteristics (e.g., ability and social heritage) that are likely to correlate with income and wealth.
Although our empirical identification relies on deaths that medical records classify as sudden and unexpected, we cannot exclude the possibility that some deaths might have been anticipated by the immediate family. To address this concern we provide a robustness check that focuses exclusively on accidents, in which death is less predictable.
Our results reveal that some individuals face entry and ongoing participation costs in the stock market. Receiving a windfall of one million Danish kroner (DKR), equivalent to 134,000 Euro, raises an individual's probability of entering the stock market within the following three years by approximately 21 percentage points, still leaving the majority of individuals as non-participants. We further analyze the time window to determine whether these results are driven by investment inertia caused by individuals slowly reallocating their portfolio. Even though some individuals delay entry, we find that the vast majority of entrants invest in the stock market within three years.
We also examine the contention, made in much literature, that procrastination is an important factor in understanding individuals' often inadequate savings for retirement.
Procrastination might cause low stock market participation if individuals neglect to invest out of carelessness or laziness. We test the impact of procrastination by analyzing the effect of inheriting stocks rather than cash. Because the fixed entry costs of participation are reasonably similar in the two cases, any difference in participation rates can largely be attributed to the effect of procrastination. 3 Although we find support for procrastination, because stocks on a per dollar basis more than double the marginal probability of market entry, the majority of individuals still actively exit the stock market.
While our results document the existence of entry and participation costs in the stock market, they also show that a surprisingly large fraction of individuals who receive considerable windfalls continue not to participate-even over longer horizons. More than half of the individuals who receive a windfall of one million DKR (134,000 Euro) are still not participating in the stock market after three years. These surprising observations hold even for highly educated and financially literate individuals who possess knowledge about the stock market. Still, among these individuals a large fraction stays out of the stock market after receiving a sizeable windfall.
Finally, we document that post-inheritance non-participants keep a substantial fraction of their inheritance in financial assets. Financial wealth in bonds and in particular cash increases significantly following inheritance. Individuals receiving a windfall of at least one million DKR, keep on average 512,000 DKR (68,700 Euro) in financial wealth.
Thus, non-participants choose to forego participation benefits that are large enough to compensate for fixed entry costs. Overall, our results demonstrate that although fixed entry and participation costs exist, they cannot explain why the majority of households are non-participants.
Understanding the barriers to participation offers better insight into why individuals shy away from the stock market. This insight is important because limited participation has serious implications for general welfare, financial markets, and an individual's expected lifetime income and consumption. Stock market participants enjoy higher lifetime consumption [Mankiw and Zeldes, 1991] , and foregone consumption often exceeds 2 percent of annual consumptions [Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout, 2005] . The lower expected lifetime consumption persists even when taking into account that many non-participants would likely be inefficient investors who incur lower returns [Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini, 2007] . As pointed out by Campbell [2006] , a better understanding of the participation constraints also help us evaluate whether individuals make investment mistakes and whether financial educators can reduce the incidence and welfare costs of such mistakes. On this important issue, our results show that although fixed participation costs keep some individuals out of the stock market, a vast majority of individuals do not respond to significant windfall wealth. For those individuals, other barriers such as behavioral, cognitive and psychological constraints are likely to dominate.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II describes the motivation and background of the paper; Section III outlines our data and presents summary statistics and our empirical strategy; Section IV presents the results of the paper; Section V provides robustness checks using alternative specifications; and Section IV concludes.
II. Motivation and background
In the standard models of lifetime consumption and portfolio choice, an individual's lifetime utility is maximized by choosing consumption and by holding a mix of safe and risky assets [Samuelson, 1969; Merton, 1969 Merton, , 1971 and Arrow, 1974] . A central result, in these models, is that all individuals should invest in the same portfolio of risky assets, with the individual's risk aversion determining the actual allocation between risky and safe assets. The standard models, therefore, predict that it is optimal for all individuals to hold a least a fraction of stocks in their portfolio and, thus, participate in the stock market.
In contrast, it has long been observed empirically that stock market participation is far from universal Friend, 1974, 1978; King and Leape, 1984; Mankiw and Zeldes, 1991] . Although participation varies greatly across countries and has increased recently [Guiso, Haliassos, and Japelli, 2003; Giannetti and Koskinen, 2005] , the overall impression is that participation is still low [Campbell, 2006] . As the observed limited participation contrasts with the theoretical predictions of the standard models, it follows that this discrepancy points to a failure in one of the underlying assumptions.
Non-participation has generally been explained by moderate fixed costs related to entry and ongoing participation [Haliassos and Bertaut, 1995; and Vissing-Jørgensen, 2002, 2003] . Such fixed costs capture time and money spent in order to invest in the stock market. These time and money costs may include any costs related to learning about stocks, acquiring information, trading, monitoring the portfolio, or preparing tax forms, which tend to be more complicated with equity ownership. Examining the magnitude of these costs, Vissing-Jørgensen [2002] demonstrates that a per-period cost of 50 USD (260 USD) in 2000 prices is enough to explain why half (three-quarters) of non-stockholders do not participate-simply because these individuals have insufficient financial wealth to make it worthwhile. While this result is not based on a formal test for the presence of such fixed costs, it does provide an economic estimate of whether participation costs are a likely explanation of limited participation. Fixed costs, however, cannot explain nonparticipation among wealthy households.
Several pre-existing studies have demonstrated cross-sectional variation in stock market participation in keeping with the fixed cost argument. In particular, participation is generally increasing with wealth, age, and education [see Mankiw and Zeldes, 1991; Haliassos and Bertaut, 1995; Bertaut, 1998; Poterba and Samwick, 1999; Guiso et al., 2003; Vissing-Jørgensen, 2003 ]. If participation is costly, it should increase with wealth because larger portfolios are more likely to be able to incur such costs. Moreover, the fixed cost argument also predicts that the population of participants should be older than non-participants because individuals will continue to participate once a fixed entry cost has been paid. 4 Because of their knowledge and lower information costs, highly educated individuals are generally perceived to have lower fixed costs and, hence, higher participation. 5 In addition, prior literature has also demonstrated a strong dependence in the decision to hold stocks over time, which is consistent with the existence of fixed entry costs [Vissing-Jørgensen, 2003 ].
Fixed costs may, as pointed out by Campbell [2006] , be the economist's representation of individual characteristics or psychological factors that make equity ownership uncomfortable for some households. From both theoretical and empirical work, several psychological explanations for non-participation have emerged. Many of these contributions focus on the individual's aversion to the uncertain outcomes of gambling, such as ambiguity aversion [Knox, 2003] , loss aversion [Ang, Bakaert, and Lui, 2005; and Dimmock, 2005] and loss aversion combined with narrow framing [Barberis, Huang, and Thaler, 2006] . Other studies have focused on behavioral or psychological factors, such as an individual's (over-) optimism [Puri and Robinson, 2005] , subjective assessment of stock market performance [Biais, Bossaerts, and Spatt, 2004; and Dominitz and Manski, 2005] , lack of trust in financial markets [Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2008] , and (low) experienced stock returns [Malmendier and Nagel, 2009] . More recently, Christelis, Jappelli, and Padula [2009], and Grinblatt, Keloharju, and Linnainmaa [2009] have documented a positive relation between participation and intelligence. According to these studies, non-participation is an investment mistake that households with high fixed costs are more likely to make. In a related study, Hong, Kubik, and Stein [2004] find that social households are more likely to invest due to peer effects.
Even though there is considerable empirical evidence to suggest that fixed costs and psychological barriers explain non-participation, prior empirical literature has relied mainly on cross-sectional variation, which makes it hard to convincingly control for individual heterogeneity and separate the fixed costs argument from the behavioral and psychological explanations. Although several studies have used panel data in an attempt to overcome these problems [e.g., Guiso, Haliassos, and Jappelli, 2001; Vissing-Jørgensen, 2003 , and Calvet, Campbell and Sodini, 2007 , changes in income and wealth are unlikely to be random. As a result, it has been difficult to establish whether the positive income and wealth effects on participation are caused by fixed costs or omitted factors, such as unobservable individual characteristics, or by macroeconomic trends that affect income, wealth, and investment opportunities. Moreover, in cross-sectional data it is impossible to separate age effects from time and cohort effects.
Empirical identification in cross-sectional analysis is also complicated by the fact that the fixed costs and the psychological barrier arguments predict relationships that are observationally equivalent. For instance, the objective cost argument predicts that better educated individuals should participate more because they face lower costs, whereas, according to the behavioral and psychological explanations, education makes it more likely that the household has learned that non-participation is an investment mistake. A similar argument can be made about the uncovered relation between cognitive abilities (intelligence) and participation. Thus, although prior literature has documented that education, the type of education (economics) and intelligence have a positive effect on participation, we do not know whether this is due to fixed costs or to behavioural or psychological barriers.
We use exogenous variation in wealth to overcome these concerns. Our candidate source of exogenous variation in wealth arises from unexpected inheritance due to the sudden death of an individual's parents. In terms of methodology, Brunnermeier and Nagel [2008] is the closest to our study. Brunnermeier and Nagel [2008] III. Nature's own experiment:
Windfall wealth from unexpected inheritance due to sudden death
Identifying exogenous variation in an individual's wealth poses a major empirical challenge. We posit that there exist at least two good candidates from hitherto unexplored sources: lottery prizes and unexpected inheritance. Although lotteries are random draws, they require participation, which introduces a potential selection bias. Unexpected inheritance resulting from sudden death, on the other hand, is a truly random experiment.
Because all individuals have legal parents, there is no selection of individuals, except by means of the death event. Thus, for this identification strategy to work, the death has to be unexpected and sudden. A sudden death is medically defined as an unexpected death that occurs instantaneously or within a few hours of an abrupt change in the person's previous clinical state. For instance, the American Academy of Paediatrics defines sudden cardiac death as a non-traumatic, nonviolent, unexpected event resulting from sudden cardiac arrest within 6 hours of a previously witnessed state of normal health. 6 As sudden death is a random draw by nature, inheritance that results from sudden death is a natural experiment that induces exogenous variation in individual's wealth. To this end, we have assembled a unique dataset from Denmark that allows us to identify windfall wealth from unexpected inheritance and relate it to stock market participation.
In addition to unique data access, the Danish case also provides us with a legal environment that eases the identification of estates and their heirs. The Danish Inheritance Act of 1964 divides relatives into three groups: Group 1 consists of the spouse, children, and grandchildren; Group 2 is the deceased's parents and siblings (and, subsidiarily, their children); and Group 3 is comprised of grandparents and their children.
By default, relatives in Group 1 inherit the estate. If no Group 1 (2) relatives exist, the relatives in Group 2 (3) will be eligible to inherit the deceased's wealth. Within Group 1 the estate is divided, with one-third transferred to the spouse and two-thirds distributed equally among the children, unless the spouse chooses to delay the children's inheritance until her own death. Grandchildren will inherit their parent's proportional share if their parent is deceased. Similar default sharing rules exist for Group 2 and 3 relatives.
In the analysis, we focus on cases where Group 1 relatives exist, but where the suddenly deceased was a widow (or in rare cases, a deceased couple). We refer to these cases as termination of households, and motivate this choice by the fact that most widows choose to delay their children's inheritance until their own death. It also simplifies the analysis, since children by default will inherit the estate in proportional shares in all such cases. The default sharing rules can partially be offset by the existence of a will, but an offspring's entitled share of the estate cannot be reduced below 50 percent of the default.
Moreover, opting out of the default sharing rule is extremely rare, as only 2 percent of the empirically relevant individuals in Denmark have drafted a will (Ret og Råd, 2008).
Consequently, the net wealth of the estates in our sample is divided equally among the offspring. with an additional 25 percent inheritance tax for people who are not immediate family members of the deceased (i.e., Group 2 or 3 relatives, which we omit in this study). The estate tax is levied on the estate's total net assets, irrespective of the underlying assets.
Identification of estates is
Unrealized capital gains incurred by the deceased from financial or real estate investments are not directly taxed, thus there are no tax incentives for beneficiaries to either keep or liquidate specific assets.
A. Data sources
We construct a dataset with 17,191 individual beneficiaries who unexpectedly inherited wealth as a result of the sudden death of their legal parents (10,344 household terminations). Our dataset contains economic, financial, and personal information about the individuals, as well as their deceased parents, from relevant official registers.
Demographic, income, and wealth data are comparable to the data used by Sodini [2007, 2009] from Sweden. The information on the official medical causes of death in our data, however, provides a novel source to identify wealth shocks.
The dataset was constructed based on four different sources made available from Statistics Denmark, as explained below. Table II shows that in the crosssection stock market participants have significantly higher income and wealth, are older, and are better educated than non-participants. It is these cross-sectional differences in individual characteristics of participants and non-participants that prior literature has interpreted as evidence of fixed entry and participation costs. Table II also shows that men and married individuals are more likely to participate in the stock market.
C. Empirical strategy
We formally test whether fixed costs explain non-participation in the stock market by identifying the effect of windfall wealth on participation around the time of the parent's sudden death. If fixed costs deter participation, we expect individuals to participate if the windfall is large enough to incur the fixed costs. As our main purpose is to understand the impact of fixed costs on entry and exit decisions, we split the sample into individuals that are either non-participants or participants before the event, respectively. We examine the entry decision for non-participants and the ongoing participation decision for participants in separate analyses, to isolate the effect of fixed entry costs on participation from reoccurring, ongoing participation costs.
Our comparison of individuals' participation choice before and after receiving windfall wealth is attractive because it effectively controls for time-invariant individual characteristics (e.g., ability and education) that are likely to impact the decision to participate in the stock market. One concern with this approach is that individuals might choose to participate because their income and wealth over time allow them to, or because the cost of participation is decreasing over time. We therefore compare the treatment group to a control group of individuals with the same characteristics who do not receive windfall wealth.
The control group is a matched sample of individuals from the Danish population, having the same age, gender, and education level, and from the same rank (vigintile) of both the income and wealth distribution as the treated individual. Moreover, we condition the matched sample on the participation decision such that we compare the reaction for pre-inheritance non-participants (participants) to a control group of non-participants (participants). For each control group we calculate the average stock market participation, which represents the expected change in participation for the non-treated conditional on individual characteristics. This approach provides us with a difference-in-differences estimate of the effect of windfall wealth on stock market participation.
All empirical estimates in this study are based on a difference-in-differences specification. The difference-in-differences approach effectively controls for timeinvariant heterogeneity. This is important as inherited wealth might correlate with individual characteristics (e.g., ability) related to social heritage. We also include control variables that focus on changes in individual characteristics that are likely to affect income, wealth, and ultimately stock market participation, and refer to these as preference shifters. 10 Our preference shifters include indicator variables if the individual marries, divorces, has children, or changes educational status during the event window. We also include year fixed effects to control for individual-invariant time effects. Finally, we note that each observation consists only of one observation before and after the event, thus keeping concerns about serial correlation to a minimum [Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan, 2003 ].
IV. Empirical results
A. Entry and participation costs in the stock market Table III provides the first insights into the effect of inherited wealth on stock market participation by comparing participation before and after the unanticipated inheritance.
Panel A focuses on the entry decision for pre-inheritance non-participants, whereas Panel B reports results for the continued participation decision for pre-inheritance participants.
Panel A shows that for the subsample of pre-inheritance non-participating individuals, 13.1 percent chose to enter the stock market three years after receiving windfall wealth. This increase is significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level.
The expected participation absent any windfall is 8.8 percentage points, as shown for the matched sample of non-participating individuals with the same age, gender, income, and wealth. The difference in differences of 4.3 percentage points is significant at the 1 percent level and implies that windfall wealth induces an additional 4.3 percent of nonparticipating individuals to enter the stock market relative to the control group. Although this increase is consistent with fixed entry costs, the estimated effect of less than 5
percentage points is surprisingly low given the emphasis on fixed entry costs in prior literature.
In Panel B we focus on the continued participation decision for the subsample of preinheritance participants. After receiving windfall wealth, 85.7 percent of the individuals still chose to participate in the stock market, compared to 85.5 percent for the matched sample. The difference in differences of 0.2 percentage points is insignificant. Thus, receiving unexpected and sudden inheritance appears to have little effect on continued participation, and the same fraction of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries exits the stock market following a sudden inheritance event.
One obvious explanation for these relatively modest reactions to unanticipated inheritance is that the windfall might be too small to offset the fixed costs. Table IV, therefore, shows the difference-in-differences estimate for deciles of inherited wealth. Perhaps the most striking result in Table IV is that, even for the top decile of inherited wealth, only 35 percent of the non-participants respond to windfall wealth by entering the stock market. Thus, almost two-thirds of these individuals remain non-participants despite receiving significant windfall wealth that averages 1.2 million DKR. Considering the size of the average windfall within this group, this result appears inconsistent with the conclusion that fixed costs offer the main explanation for non-participation.
Panel B shows difference in differences for continued participants across deciles of windfall wealth. Continued participation increases with inherited wealth, although the effects are quite modest. The difference in differences are only significant for the two top deciles; even among these individuals, who receive large windfalls averaging 2.6 million DKR, around 5 percent still choose to sell out. Thus, in keeping with the estimates in Table III , we find little evidence to suggest that ongoing participation costs are important in explaining stock market participation outcomes.
Although the difference-in-differences estimates successfully control for timeinvariant individual heterogeneity (e.g., ability and social heritage) that might affect stock market participation, individuals' household status (e.g., marital status) might change over time. In Table V we therefore run cross-sectional regressions of the difference in differences on inherited wealth while controlling for preference shifters and year fixedeffects.
In Column 1 of Table V , we regress the difference in differences on the amount of inherited wealth and find that the probability of entering the stock market (relative to the matched sample) is 12.3 percentage points larger for each million DKR (134,000 EUR) of inherited wealth. In Column 2 we include a squared term of inherited wealth, capturing the implication of a fixed cost argument that the marginal effect of wealth on stock market participation is decreasing. Consistent with this argument we find that the square term is negative and significant at the 1 percent level. The marginal effect of the first million DKR of inherited wealth implies a 21.2 percentage point larger probability of participation, compared to a marginal effect of 18.4 percentage points for the following million. Although, our difference-in-differences estimates provide evidence of fixed entry costs in the stock market, the estimated effects are strikingly small: even substantial windfall wealth of one million DKR (134,000 EUR) only increases participation rates by around 21.2 percentage points.
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Columns 3 and 4 focus on continued participation. Column 3 shows that windfall wealth of one million DKR (134,000 EUR) only implies a 0.4 percentage point larger probability that the beneficiary will stay in the stock market. Although, the marginal effect of inherited wealth increases when we include a squared term in Column 4, the effects are still small. Even large windfalls can only explain a trivial fraction of the variation in the ongoing participation decisions. Thus, although the evidence is supportive of fixed ongoing participation costs, it appears to be a second order effect.
B. More evidence on entry and participation costs
In this section we exploit variation in characteristics of beneficiaries to understand how age, education, and financial literacy affect fixed entry and ongoing participation costs.
In Column 1 of Table VI we show how age matters for stock market participation. If one-time entry costs are important, we expect older individuals to respond less than younger beneficiaries to windfalls, because they have a shorter time horizon to harvest the benefits of the sunk cost. Alternatively, we expect age to have a negligible effect if the fixed costs represent only ongoing participation cost. To investigate this effect we interact age with inherited wealth. In Column 1 we find no direct effect of age, but a significant effect on participation when age is interacted with the size of windfall wealth. Although the interaction term at first glance seems small, the marginal effect of inheriting one million DKR is 41.8 percentage points for a 20-year-old individual, as compared to only 9.8 percent points for a 60-year old. We interpret this as evidence of one-time costs related to entering the stock market
In Column 2 of Table VI we examine how education matters for stock market participation. If education lowers the participation costs, as argued in prior literature, we expect to find a direct effect of education on participation, but a smaller per-dollar effect of inheritance when controlling for the level. Simply put, individuals with higher levels of education should react more positively to even small levels of windfall wealth than do individuals with lower levels of education. Moreover, this difference in participation outcomes related to educational levels should decline as inherited wealth increases.
We find that length of education has a direct statistically significant effect on participation and that inheritance has a smaller per-dollar effect for highly educated individuals-although the effects are very modest. Each additional year of education raises the participation rate by 0.52 percentage points, whereas one million DKR of inherited wealth decreases this effect by 0.59 percentage points per year of schooling.
Evaluating the joint effect, one has to add the direct effect of inherited wealth with the interacting effect of education: Consequently, a high school drop-out with 10 years of schooling is 7.6 percentage points more likely to enter the stock market when he inherits 100,000 DKR. When inherited wealth increases to one million DKR, the marginal effect on participation increases to 27.4 percentage points. In comparison, an individual with a university degree (17 years of schooling) will be 10.8 and 26.9 percentage point more likely to participate when inheriting 100,000 and one million DKR, respectively. Thus, for low levels of windfalls, the highly educated respond more positively to inherited wealth, whereas the difference diminishes as inherited wealth increases. This finding bolsters the interpretation given in much of the prior literature, that individuals with longer periods of education have lower fixed objective costs.
A potential explanation for the low explanatory power of fixed costs in the natural experiment is that some individuals might be unaware of the existence of stocks as an asset class. For instance, Guiso and Jappelli [2005] report that over 35 percent of Italian households in the mid and late 1990s apparently were unaware of stocks. On the other hand, Campbell [2006] argues that although this might explain non-participation in some countries, this proportion is likely to be much smaller in countries with more developed financial markets. To ascertain that our results are not driven by unawareness, we examine whether the reactions to windfall wealth are different for individuals who are financially literate.
In Columns 3 and 4 of This effect remains significant even when controlling for the direct effect of education (Column 4). In summary, unawareness does not play a large role in explaining nonparticipation in our setting.
C. The effect of investment inertia and procrastination
Two plausible explanations for the modest response to windfall wealth are investment inertia and procrastination. We examine investment inertia and procrastination by two separate approaches: First, the effect of inertia is addressed by extending the horizon of the evaluation period. Second, procrastination is examined by analyzing whether the composition of the inherited estate's portfolio matters for beneficiaries' portfolio choice.
If individuals are slow to change their investment decisions, inertia will negatively bias the estimated effect of inherited wealth on stock market entry. In related findings, prior literature has documented the presence of inertia in asset allocation. Participants in retirement savings plans, for instance, rarely alter the allocations of their contributions or rebalance their portfolios [Madrian and Shea, 2001; Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sundén, 2003; Ameriks and Zeldes, 2004; Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick, 2002; . Consistent with inertia, capital gains and losses are also found to generate little portfolio rebalancing in U.S. survey data studied by Brunnermeier and Nagel [2008] .
In Table VII we therefore look at the effect outside the current event windows from year -1 to +3. In particular, we examine when inherited wealth has predictive power in explaining the stock market entry decision (Columns 1 to 3) and the continued participation decision (Columns 4 to 6) in alternative windows covering the initial period from -1 to +1 and subsequent periods from year +1 to +3 and year +3 to +5. For the entry (ongoing participation) decision, our sample includes only non-participants (participants) at the beginning of each event window. Thus, the marginal effects identify the effect of delaying the investment decision on account of inertia.
We find some evidence of investment inertia as inherited wealth is positively related to participation decisions in subsequent periods. Individuals who inherit one million DKR are 8.9 percentage points more likely to decide to enter the stock market from year +1 to +3. However, in the subsequent event window, from year +3 to +5, we only find insignificant effects of inherited wealth on participation. Thus, although some individuals do delay the investment decision on account of inertia, inertia cannot explain the surprisingly low effect of fixed entry costs on stock market participation in our main window from -1 to +3..
In Columns 5 and 6 we find limited and only marginally significant effect of inherited wealth on ongoing participation decisions in subsequent periods. This is consistent with our general finding that ongoing participation costs seem to be a second order effect in explaining why individuals leave the stock market.
The second aspect of investment inertia is related to procrastination. Prior literature has demonstrated that procrastination plays an important role in individuals' savings and investment decisions. For instance, Madrian and Shea [2001] show that 401(k) enrollment rates are significantly higher under automatic enrollment of employees. If the participation decision in our setting is affected by procrastination, inheriting an estate holding stocks should increase the probability of participation, simply because it changes the active decision from deciding to enter the stock market to choosing to exit the market. The institutional setting is helpful in identifying the effect of procrastination because potential capital gains not are subject to taxation in the event of inheritance. Thus, inheritance tax is solely determined by net wealth, and unaffected by the composition of wealth.
In Column 1 of Table VIII we therefore include an indicator variable taking the value 1 if the estate held stocks. The effect of inheriting stock on participation rates is both economically and statistically significant. Inheritance of stocks increases the participation rate by 12.7 percentage points. However, this effect might capture the factor that wealthier estates are more likely to hold stocks. In Column 2, we therefore split inherited wealth into two separate covariates: inherited wealth excluding stocks, and value of inherited stocks. Inherited wealth excluding stocks has almost the same effect on participation as that tabulated in Table V : one million DKR in inheritance from other sources than stocks imply a 18.0 percentage point larger probability of participation. Now, compare this to the estimated coefficient on the value of inherited stocks. Inheriting one million DKR worth of stocks increases the probability of stock market participation by 43.7 percentage points. Thus, the effect on participation of inheriting stocks is significantly larger than that of inheriting cash in both economic and statistical terms.
In Column 3 we expand the specification by including the indicator variable for inheriting stocks. Again, the indicator variable for inheritance of stocks is positive and highly significant. If the estate held stocks, the probability of participation increases by 12.2 percentage points. The difference between the first inherited million DKR worth of stocks compared to inheriting cash is only 9.3 percentage points. Still, despite the marginal effect of procrastination, fixed costs cannot explain why the majority of individuals shy away from stocks.
D. Interpretation
We use exogenous variation in an individual's wealth to identify the relative importance of fixed entry and participation cost in understanding why people shy away from the stock market. Although we generally find evidence consistent with the existence of such costs, our results demonstrate that these costs have relatively modest power in explaining limited participation. Three years after receiving windfall wealth, only 13.1 percent of all beneficiaries have invested in stocks. Among individuals receiving large inheritance of more than one million DKR, around one-third enters the stock market, while two-thirds remain non-participants.
Our ability to infer that non-participation for the majority of households cannot be explained by fixed costs hinges on the assumption that individuals actually keep some of the windfall as financial wealth. If the entire inheritance is instantly consumed we might learn little about investment behavior, but more about individual preferences to consume inheritance. In Table IX we report the holdings of financial wealth in cash and bonds both before and after receiving inheritance for individuals who remain non-participants.
Panel A reports individual financial wealth and Panel B reports household levels. The average holding of financial assets almost doubles for individuals who receive windfall
wealth. An average beneficiary increases his holdings of financial assets by 31,800 DKR (4,300 EUR). More importantly, for individuals who receive large windfalls of more than one million DKR, the financial assets increase by 207,600 DKR (27,900 Euro), respectively. Most of this increase comes from bank accounts that often carry the name of both the beneficiary and his spouse. Thus, individual holdings will mechanically underestimate the change in financial wealth due to inheritance, because deposits in bank accounts with two account holders only count half at the individual level. In Panel B we therefore aggregate to the household level. The financial wealth increases on average by 58,700 DKR (7,900 Euro) to 125,800 DKR (16,900 Euro). For households receiving large windfalls of more than one million DKR, financial wealth increases by 364,900 DKR (49,000 Euro) to 512,000 DKR (68,700 Euro). Thus, the individuals who receive large windfalls and remain non-participants have substantial financial wealth.
The fixed cost theory calculates a dollar value for the likely benefit of participation given financial wealth, the fraction of financial wealth in stocks conditional on entry and the (certainty equivalent) expected excess return on the stock market. If those individuals who remain non-participants invest the same fraction of their financial wealth in stocks as participants (33.6 percent), then the potential yearly benefit from participation is equal to 8,600 DKR (1,150 Euros) per year assuming a 5 percent certainty equivalent excess return on stocks (after tax). 12 To be able to explain non-participation, ongoing participation costs (fixed entry costs) have to exceed the yearly benefit from participation (the present value of the yearly benefits of participation, which is equal to the annuity value of the estimated yearly participation benefit). Thus, because of the large potential benefit from participation, fixed costs are unlikely to explain why many households who receive large windfalls choose not to participate. 13 These striking findings show that although fixed entry and participation costs can account for around one-third of non-participants, a majority of individuals seem to be constrained by other factors.
V. Alternative specifications and robustness checks

A. Focusing on accidents
One concern with the prior analysis it that although we identify deaths that appear to be sudden and unexpected to a family outsider, these might be somewhat expected by the deceased and their beneficiaries, as death is inevitable. To address this concern, Columns 1 and 5 in Table X show the results from the subsample of deaths caused by accidents.
The results are very similar to the results reported in Table V . For the entry decision, the marginal effect of one million DKR of windfall wealth has a 23.0 percentage point higher probability of holding stocks after three years. The marginal effect of one million DKR of inherited wealth on continued participation is 5.2 percentage points. Thus, by focusing 12 The benefit from participation is calculated as financial wealth * portfolio share in stocks * certainty equivalent excess return on stocks = 512.000 * 0.336 * 0.05 = 8,600 DKR. In comparison, Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) assumes a 4 percent certainty equivalent for the US. Capital gains are not subject to taxation during the sample period for investors with small stock investments in Denmark, whereas U.S. investors pay 20% tax. 13 To be conservative we ignore the impact of paying off mortgage, which in Denmark is backed by bonds. Paying off mortgage is, thus, equivalent to increasing financial wealth invested in bonds. As a result the estimated benefit from participation is conservative in the above calculation.
on accidents that, by definition, are unpredictable, we confirm the results from our analysis based on a medical definition of sudden deaths.
B. Focusing on cases in which both parents died within a year
Our results might also be affected by our reliance on household terminations, which tend to be dominated by deceased widows. Given that the beneficiaries in these cases have already lost one parent, inheritance might be expected, in particular for older individuals, even if the cause of death is medically defined as sudden. To address this possibility, we identify the subsample of household terminations in which both parents died suddenly within a given year. In such cases, inheritance is more likely to be unanticipated. Columns 2 and 6 of Table X show the results for pre-inheritance nonparticipants and participants, respectively. For non-participants, our results are consistent with the prior analysis. One million DKR of inheritance has a 22.0 percentage point effect on participation, which is lower than the effect estimated in Column 2 of Table V . For pre-inheritance participants inherited wealth is also positive.
C. Focusing on a sample within which sibling rivalry is absent
Our results on investment inertia might also be explained by potential sibling rivalry and infighting over the estate. Because of such potential conflicts among siblings, estates with many beneficiaries may take a longer time to liquidate, subsequent delaying the actual transfer of inherited wealth. Although Danish inheritance law limits the liquidation period to 12 months (counting from the day of death), cases with several siblings might extend the process all the way to its deadline. Potential sibling rivalry might thereby reduce the time over which we measure the response in participation to less than one year.
In Columns 3 and 7 of Table X we therefore focus solely on estates with a single beneficiary (i.e., a lone child), within which such conflicts are absent. Again, we obtain results consistent with our main analysis.
D. Aggregation to household decisions
All of our results focus on beneficiaries' individual investment decisions. One valid concern is how much individual behavior differs from household behavior, and how assets are reallocated within the family. In unreported regressions, we have aggregated the analysis to the household level without detecting any meaningful differences in the results.
In the aggregation, we only consider households with stable characteristics during the event window. 14 Thus, if the household experiences death or divorce, which will change the composition of the household, we exclude the observation from the sample.
In Columns 4 and 8, we report the general effect at the household level of inherited wealth on the entry and exit decisions, respectively. The marginal effect of windfall wealth on participation is 21.6 percentage points, which is coherent with our prior findings.
Thus, our main result, suggesting that fixed participation costs explain little of the variation in participation decisions, is not an artifact of carrying out the analysis at the individual level.
VI. Conclusions
The results from the natural experiment reveal that some individuals face entry and ongoing participation costs in the stock market. Receiving a windfall of one million DKR raises the probability of entering the stock market by approximately 21 percentage points, still leaving out many as non-participants. Although the magnitude of this result is affected by investment inertia and procrastination, we still find that a majority of 14 As a result of the focus on stable households, we do not include preference shifters in the analysis.
individuals do not respond to windfall wealth, even over long horizons. This holds even for highly educated individuals, as well as for economists and people employed in the financial industry with access to information and knowledge about the stock market.
Moreover, non-participants keep substantial wealth in cash and bonds, thereby foregoing the benefits from stock market participation. Thus, although fixed entry and ongoing participation costs keep some individuals out of the stock market, they cannot explain why the majority of non-participants shy away from stocks. Note: We report descriptive statistics: mean and standard deviation for all beneficiaries, beneficiaries that are pre-inheritance participants and non-participants, respectively. For each beneficiary we observe income after tax, wealth, age, gender, years of schooling, marital status and whether there are children in the household. For each set of descriptive statistics we also compute the difference in the average characteristics of pre-inheritance participants and non-participants and test whether these differences are significantly different from zero. All amounts are in thousand year 2000 DKR. Standard errors are in parentheses, and t-statistics are in square brackets. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Note: Unexpected inheritance is our sample of individuals who suddenly inherit their parent's estate. The matched sample is a control group of individuals of the same age, gender, length of education, and rank (vigintile) of both income and wealth distribution. Panel A reports the entry decision for the subsample of pre-inheritance non-participants 1 year before and 3 years after the sudden death event, and differences in these measures around the event. Panel B presents before, after, and differences for continued participation decisions for the subsample of pre-inheritance participants. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Note: This table presents the average stock market participation 1 year before, 3 years after, the difference between these and difference in differences around the sudden inheritance by deciles of inherited wealth Difference in differences is the difference between the sudden inheritance sample and a matched sample of individuals with the same age, gender, length of education, and rank (vigintile) of both income and wealth distribution (see Table III ). Inherited wealth is in thousand year 2000 DKR. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Note: The dependent variable is the difference in differences in stock market participation 1 year before and 3 years after the sudden inheritance. Difference in differences is the difference between the change in the treatment group receiving windfall wealth and a matched control sample. The matched sample consists of individuals of the same age, gender, length of education, and rank (vigintile) of both income and wealth distribution. Inherited wealth is measured in million year 2000 DKR. Inherited wealth squared is the square of inherited wealth. Age is measured in years. Financial literate is an indicator taking the value 1 if the individual has a university degree in economics, finance, or a related field, or obtained, through an apprenticeship in the financial industry, knowledge about financial markets. Preference shifters include controls (indicator variables) for changes in marital status, family size, and education. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Note: The dependent variable is the difference in differences in stock market participation for alternative event windows. Difference in differences is the difference between the change in the treatment group receiving windfall wealth and a matched control sample. Column 1 through 3 is entry into the stock market. Column 4 through 6 is exit decisions out of the stock market. The matched sample consists of individuals of the same age, gender, length of education, and rank (vigintile) of both income and wealth distribution. Inherited wealth is measured in million year 2000 DKR. Inherited wealth squared is the square of inherited wealth. Preference shifters include controls (indicator variables) for changes in marital status, family size, and education. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Note: The dependent variable is the difference in differences in stock market participation 1 year before and 3 years after the sudden inheritance. Difference in differences is the difference between the change in the treatment group receiving windfall wealth and a matched control sample. The matched sample consists of individuals of the same age, gender, length of education, and rank (vigintile) of both income and wealth distribution. Inherited wealth, inherited wealth excluding stocks, and value of inherited stocks are measured in million year 2000 DKR. Inherited estate held stocks (0/1) is an indicator variable for whether the estate held stocks. Preference shifters include controls (indicator variables) for changes in marital status, family size, and education. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Note: All panels report financial wealth for beneficiaries that remain non-participants after receiving windfall wealth. Financial wealth is the sum of bonds and cash, and is reported pre-inheritance (year -1) and post-inheritance (year +3). Panel A shows individual holdings, whether Panel B shows the holdings at the household level. If bank accounts are shared within the household, the reported holding of cash at the individual level is equal to half of the total holdings at the household level. All numbers are in 2000 DKR. Note: The dependent variable is the difference in differences in stock market participation 1 year before and 3 years after around the sudden inheritance. Difference in differences is the difference between the change in the treatment group receiving windfall wealth and a matched control sample. We use four different subsamples: Accidents include household terminations caused by accidents. Both parents include household terminations in which both parents died within the year. No siblings include household terminations with a single beneficiary. Household aggregation includes the household of the beneficiaries if the household's characteristics are stable during the evaluation period (see Section IV.D). The matched sample consists of individuals of the same age, gender, length of education, and rank (vigintile) of both income and wealth distribution in Columns 1-3, and 5-7. In Columns 4 and 8, the matched sample consists of households with the same average age, highest length of education, number of household members, and rank (vigintile) of both income and wealth distribution. Inherited wealth is measured in million year 2000 DKR. Preference shifters include controls (indicator variables) for changes in marital status, family size, and education. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
